

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 245331

47

ORIGIN NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PRS-01 H-02 EUR-12 IO-10 AF-06 /042 R

66624

DRAFTED BY:NEA/P:RONEILL

APPROVED BY:NEA/P:GFSHERMAN

S/PRS - MR. FUNSETH (INFO)

H - MR. FLATEN (INFO)

EUR/P- MR. JERABEK

IO/P - MR. BLACHLY

NEA/ARN - MR. BULLEN

AF/P - MRS. RUSSELL

NEA/EGY - MR. MATTHEWS

----- 125936

R 152320Z OCT 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY KUWAIT

AMCONSUL DHAHRAN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM

AMEMBASSY MANAMA

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY RABAT

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY ROME

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION NATO

USINT BAGHDAD

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

AMEMBASSY MOGADISCIO

USMISSION GENEVA

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 245331

AMEMBASSY DOHA

CINCEUR

UNCLAS STATE 245331

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 12 INTERVIEW ON "MEET THE PRESS"

GENEVA FOR MEPC DEL
CINCEUR FOR POLAD
LONDON FOR KINSOLVING

FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND GUIDANCE FOLLOWING ARE MIDDLE EAST EXTRACTS OF SECRETARY'S OCTOBER 12 INTERVIEW ON "MEET THE PRESS":

MR. VALERIANI: MR. SECRETARY, EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT HAS SAID THAT HE WILL ASK FOR AMERICAN MILITARY AID WHEN HE COMES TO WASHINGTON LATER THIS MONTH. WHAT WILL BE THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: PRESIDENT SADAT HAS INDICATED TO MANY VISITORS THAT HE WOULD ASK FOR MILITARY AID, HAVING INTERRUPTED HIS RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

WE DON'T KNOW WHETHER IN FACT HE WILL HAVE A SPECIFIC SHOPPING LIST OR WILL ASK FOR IT IN GENERAL.

I DON'T THINK WE WILL BE PREPARED AT THIS MOMENT TO MAKE ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS OF MILITARY AID, BUT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM WITH HIM IN GENERAL TERMS.

MR. VALERIANI: HAVE YOU GIVEN HIM ANY ASSURANCES THAT YOU WILL GIVE SUCH A REQUEST SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION OR SERIOUS CONSIDERATION?

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 245331

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE ARE PREPARED TO DISCUSS IT WITH HIM BUT AT THIS TIME NOT IN TERMS OF SPECIFIC SHOPPING LISTS.

MR. VALERIANI: ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE EQUATION, MR. SECRETARY, BY MAKING SO MANY PROMISES TO ISRAEL, IN ORDER TO GET ISRAEL IN THE RIGHT MOOD TO MAKE CERTAIN CONCESSIONS IN THE SINAI AGREEMENT, HAVEN'T YOU REALLY GIVEN UP MOST OF YOUR LEVERAGE FOR GETTING ISRAEL TO MAKE TOUGHER CONCESSIONS DOWN THE ROAD IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS, OR THE PALESTINIANS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, FIRST OF ALL, THE SO-CALLED CONCESSIONS TO ISRAEL, OR ASSURANCES TO ISRAEL, HAVE TO BE

SEEN IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND THE ASSURANCES THAT WERE GIVEN IN CONNECTION WITH ITS MOST RECENT AGREEMENT WERE NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT FROM ASSURANCES THAT HAVE BEEN GIVEN IN CONNECTION WITH OTHER AGREEMENTS. WHEN YOU ARE DEALING WITH A COUNTRY WHICH HAS ONLY ONE STEADY ALLY, ASSURANCES ARE OF VERY GREAT CONSEQUENCE.

SECONDLY, THE RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL SHOULD NOT BE CONCEIVED IN TERMS OF A PRESSURE OPERATION IN WHICH WE MUST BE ABLE TO PRESSURE ISRAEL BEFORE EVERY NEGOTIATION, AND, FINALLY, OUR BASIC RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL DEPENDS ON A CONTINUING NEED FOR CLOSE CONSULTATION AND CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN US AND ISRAEL. AND THAT FACT IS GOING TO WEIGH HEAVILY IN ISRAELI CONSIDERATIONS, WHATEVER DECISIONS MAY HAVE BEEN MADE ON THIS OR THAT ITEM.

SO I BELIEVE THE NATURE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL GIVES US SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE OUR VIEWS HEARD SYMPATHETICALLY.

MR. VALERIANI: WHY WAS IT NECESSARY TO PUT ALL THIS IN WRITING IN SPECIFIC TERMS NOW, SO THAT ISRAEL CAN AVOID PRESSURE IN THE FUTURE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT IS THE SORT OF UNDERSTANDINGS

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 245331

THAT HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, HAVE BEEN CHARACTERISTIC OF AMERICA'S ISRAELI RELATIONS THROUGH THE WHOLE HISTORY OF AMERICAN-ISRAELI RELATIONS.

THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT IN THE PAST THESE DOCUMENTS, AT LEAST IN RECENT YEARS, THESE DOCUMENTS HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE ON A CLASSIFIED BASIS. THIS TIME THEY WERE PUBLISHED AND THEIR BEING PUBLISHED GAVE THEM A FORMALITY AND SUBJECTED THEM TO A KIND OF TEXTUAL ANALYSIS THAT WAS NEVER INTENDED AND WHICH, IF ONE HAD BROUGHT THEM INTO THE CONTEXT OF THE OVERALL AND LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIPS, WOULD HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS NOT AN UNUSUAL EVENT IN OUR RELATIONSHIP.

MR. DANIEL: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE REMARKED THAT OUR PLEDGES TO ISRAEL HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED, BUT THEY WERE NOT PUBLISHED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

THIS LATEST AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS GOING TO COST US AMERICANS BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MAY INVOLVE US IN HIGHLY DANGEROUS COMMITMENTS. WHY CAN'T WE KNOW FORMALLY, OFFICIALLY AND FULLY WHAT HAS BEEN PROMISED

IN OUR NAMES?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN PUBLISHED WAS SUBMITTED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT WITHIN THREE DAYS OF THE COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO THE CONGRESS, SO THERE WAS ABSOLUTELY NO ATTEMPT TO KEEP ANYTHING FROM THE CONGRESS.

SECONDLY, WE WERE PREPARED TO WORK OUT WITH THE CONGRESS AN AGREED SUMMARY THAT WOULD HAVE PUT BEFORE THE PUBLIC THE ESSENCE OF THE AMERICAN COMMITMENT, SO THAT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC WOULD HAVE KNOWN PRECISELY WHAT IT WAS WE WERE REALLY COMMITTED TO.

WHAT WE ATTEMPTED TO AVOID WAS FORMULATIONS THAT IN THEMSELVES WERE NOT LEGALLY BINDING, BUT INDICATED A GENERAL GUIDEPST OF POLICY, AND TO AVOID FORCING OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO TAKE A FORMAL POSITION WITH RESPECT TO UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 245331

UNDERSTANDINGS THAT IN THE PAST HAD ALWAYS BEEN HANDLED ON THIS BASIS.

FINALLY, I DO NOT AGREE HAT THIS RECENT AGREEMENT COST THE AMERICAN PUBLIC BILLIONS OF DOLLARS. LAST YEAR THE CONGRESS VOTED IN A COMBINATION TF EMERGENCY AND REGULAR AID, DOLS 3 BILLION FOR ISRAEL WITHOUT THE AGREEMENT. BEFORE THE AGREEMENT ISRAEL REQUESTED DOLS 2.6 BILLION AS

ITS REGULAR NEED FOR ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND WE HAD SET ASIDE IN OUR PLANNING A CERTAIN AMOUNT TO BE ASKED FOR EGYPT. IN FACT, WE WILL ASK FOR LESS THAN THE ISRAELI REQUEST WHEN WE SUBMIT OUR AID PACKAGE TO THE CONGRESS, AND THE ADDITIONAL SUMS THAT THIS AGREEMENT COSTS ARE, IF ANYTHING, RELATIVELY SMALL. BEYOND THAT, WE HAVE TAKEN NO COMMITMENTS THAT INVOLVE ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES THAT INVOLVE THE THREAT OF WAR, OR THE RISK OF WAR.

I THINK THESE ARE FACTS THAT HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD. I REPEAT: WE HAVE PUT EVERYTHING BEFORE THE CONGRESS THAT WAS LATER PUBLISHED AND THE ONLY DISAGREEMENT CONCERNED THE FORM OF PUBLICATION, AND WHETHER WE COULD WORK OUT WITH THE CONGRESS A FORM OF PUBLICATION THAT WOULD RISK THE FOREIGN POLICY DANGERS.

MR. LISAGOR: MR. SECRETARY, QUITE APART FROM THE AMOUNTS INVOLVED, GIVEN THE MOOD OF THE CONGRESS, HAVE YOU MADE COMMITMENTS OR PROMISES OR ASSURWNCS IN THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS THAT THIS ADMINISTRATION, OR POSSIBLY THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION, WILL NOT BE ABLE TO FULFILL?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE BASIC COMMITMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE BEEN PUT BEFORE THE CONGRESS. THERE ARE TWO CATEGORIES OF ACTIONS, THOSE THAT CAN BE DONE ON PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, AND THOSE THAT REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION AND APPROPRIATION.

THOSE THAT CAN BE CARRIED OUT ON THE BASIS OF PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY, WE ARE CERTAIN WE ARE ABLE TO FULFILL EITHER IN THIS ADMINISTRATION OR IN SUCCEEDING ADMINISTRATIONS.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 245331

THOSE THAT REQUIRE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION HAVE BEEN CAREFULLY LIMITED IN ALL THE DOCUMENTS WE HAVE AGREED TO, AS BEING SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL ACTION. NO SPECIFIC AMOUNTS WERE MENTIONED, AND THERE THE MOOD THAT YOU DESCRIBE MAY IN FACT BE A FACTOR. BUT WE THINK IT IS TERRIBLY IMPORTANT THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS NOT THE AGREEMENT THAT PROVIDES THE NEED--THAT CREATES THE NEED FOR ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES, BUT THE LONG-TERM NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT THE ASSISTANCE TO THE PARTIES ANTEDATES THE AGREEMENT.

MR. LISAGOR: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE BEEN MET WITH A GREAT DEAL OF SKEPTICISM AND SUSPICION IN THE CONGRESS IN THE DEBATE OVER THE SINAI NEGOTIATIONS IN YOUR OWN TESTIMONY. HAS THIS BEEN A RECOIL AGAINST THE SECRECY

THAT HAS GONE ON IN THE RECENT PAST AND THE LACK OF CONSULTATION THAT WENT ON IN OTHER FOREIGN POLICY MATTERS RECENTLY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK IN FAIRNESS TO THE CONGRESS ONE HAS TO POINT OUT IF ONE READS THE WHOLE TRANSCRIPT OF ALL THE SESSIONS, EXECUTIVE AND PUBLIC, THERE WAS OVERWHELMING SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. ITS BASIC ATTITUDE--MAYBE NOT IN FRONT OF TELEVISION CAMERAS, BUT THE BASIC ATTITUDE IN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES AND THE EXECUTIVE WAS ONE OF DEALING WITH A COMMON PROBLEM IN A JOINT WAY.

HOWEVER, THERE IS PROFOUND CONCERN IN THE CONGRESS, MUCH OF WHICH I CAN UNDERSTAND, THAT THE PENDULUM HAD SWUNG TOO FAR IN THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES IN THE DIRECTION OF EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AND THE CONGRESS WANTS TO MAKE VERY SURE THAT IT IS NOT GIVING A BLANK CHECK TO THE EXECUTIVE FOR CONSEQUENCES THAT THE CONGRESS NEVER INTENDED, AS IT BELIEVES IT DID IN THE CASE OF THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION. THAT INTENTION, I THINK IS JUSTIFIED, AND WE ARE PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IT.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 245331

THERE IS CONCERN WITH EXCESSIVE SECRECY WHICH, TOO, WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO MEET.

ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE HAS TO UNDERSTAND THAT A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF CONFIDENTIALITY IS ESSENTIAL, OR THE DIPLOMATIC PROCESS WILL STOP, SO SOMEWHERE BETWEEN THOSE TWO EXTREMES ONE HAS TO FIND A JOINT POSITION BETWEEN THE CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE. BUT WE ARE NOT COMPLAINING ABOUT WHAT HAPPENS IN THE CONGRESS.

MR. VALERIANI: ANOTHER QUESTION ON THE AGREEMENT, MR. SECRETARY. IN THE CONFIDENTIAL ASSURANCES TO EGYPT, THE UNITED STATES PROMISES TO CONSULT WITH EGYPT IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI VIOLATION OF THE AGREEMENT ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE VIOLATION, AND POSSIBLE REMEDIAL ACTION.

NOW, WHAT DOES "REMEDIAL ACTION" MEAN? WOULD THAT INVOLVE HOLDING UP SUPPLIES TO ISRAEL IN THE CASE OF AN ATTACK?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: FIRST OF ALL, EXACTLY THE SAME ASSURANCE WAS GIVEN TO ISRAEL AND BOTH SIDES KNEW THAT THE SAME ASSURANCE WAS GIVEN TO THE OTHER SIDE. WHAT IS MEANT WAS THAT THE UNITED STATES AS THE PARTY THAT WAS THE

PRINCIPAL MEDIATOR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT KNEW THE RECORD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, WOULD MAKE AN EFFORT, IN CASE OF A VIOLATION, TO POINT OUT WHAT ITS JUDGMENT WAS OF THE SIGNIFICANCE AND OF THE POSSIBLE CAUSE OF THE VIOLATIONS.

WHAT REMEDIAL ACTION WE WOULD TAKE THAT HAS NOT BEEN DISCUSSED WITH EITHER SIDE.

IN THE OTHER TWO DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS, THOSE BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL AND THOSE BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WHAT HAPPENED IS THAT A VIOLATION WILL BE BROUGHT TO OUR ATTENTION AND WE THEN BRING IT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SIDE THAT IS ACCUSED AND IN EVERY CASE THAT I CAN REMEMBER A REMEDY HAS BEEN FOUND. THIS IS ONE OF THOSE CLAUSES THAT CODIFIES EXISTING PRACTICE AND IS NOT A NOVEL DEPARTURE.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 245331

MR. DANIEL: MR. SECRETARY, YOU SEEM TO AGREE THAT WE ARE NOW COMING TO THE END OF THE STEP-BY-STEP PROCESS OF MAINTAINING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I THINK WE THEN HAVE TO FIND

SOME LARGER FRAMEWORKS WHICH COMBINE SEVERAL OF THE
ISSUES AND SEVERAL OF THE PARTIES AND MAYBE ALL OF THE
ISSUES AND ALL OF THE PARTIES. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEET THE PRESS, TELEVISION BROADCASTING, PRESS CONFERENCES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 15 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE245331
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750359-0185
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197510102/baaaacvz.tel
Line Count: 330
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NEA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 7
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ElyME
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 SEP 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 Sep 2003 by MorefiRH>; APPROVED <20 FEB 2004 by ElyME>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: N/A
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: PFOR, XF, (KISSINGER, HENRY A)
To: ALGIERS
AMMAN
BEIRUT
CAIRO
DAMASCUS
JIDDA

KUWAIT
DHAHRAN
JERUSALEM
KHARTOUM
MANAMA
TEHRAN
TEL AVIV
TRIPOLI
RABAT
LONDON
ROME
USUN N Y
NATO
BAGHDAD
NOUAKCHOTT
MOGADISCIO
GENEVA
DOHA
CINCEUR
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006